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Abstract
We examine the choice of voting rules by legal cartels with en-
forcement capabilities in the presence of uncertainty about demand
and costs. We show that cartels face a trade-oﬀ between the com-
mitment advantages of more stringent majority requirements and the
loss of ﬂexibility resulting from them. Expected heterogeneity in costs
or demand conditions leads away from simple majority toward more
stringent rules, while larger membership to the cartel leads away from
unanimity toward less restrictive rules. Evidence from the “shipping
conferences” of the late 1950s largely supports our model. With few
ﬁrms, the rule favored by heterogeneous conferences is unanimity. In
larger cartels, the favored rule is either 2/3 or 3/4-majority rule.
∗Martinelli: Centro de Investigaci´ on Econ´ omica, Instituto Tecnol´ ogico Aut´ onomo de
M´ exico, Camino Santa Teresa 930, M´ exico, DF 10700, MEXICO [martinel@itam.mx];
Sicotte: Economics Department, University of Vermont, 94 University Place, Burlington,
VT 05405-0114, USA [richard.sicotte@uvm.edu].1 Introduction
Rather than illegal price conspiracies, plagued by opportunities to cheat and
haunted by the activity of antitrust authorities (as often depicted in introduc-
tory economics textbooks), many real-world cartels are legal organizations,
whose price-ﬁxing or volume-restricting agreements are enforced by the co-
ercive power of the state. Some, like the shipping cartels to which we devote
attention in this paper, resemble political entities. They have written “con-
stitutions” specifying who belongs in the cartel, as well as how are collective
decisions going to be made (usually through some voting procedure).
We study the choice of voting rules by legal cartels with imperfect revenue
sharing in the presence of uncertainty about demand and costs. We show that
cartels face a trade-oﬀ between the commitment advantages of more stringent
majority requirements and the loss of ﬂexibility resulting from them. On one
hand, supermajority requirements allow the cartel to commit to prices that
maximizes the sum of proﬁts, rather than the proﬁts of the majority. On
the other hand, supermajority requirements result in a loss of ﬂexibility to
modify prices in response to extreme realizations of the demand and cost
conditions. The optimal qualiﬁed majority rule for a cartel maximizing the
expected beneﬁts of member ﬁrms results from balancing the beneﬁts and
costs of commitment. More expected heterogeneity among cartel members
increases the beneﬁts of commitment, while cartel size increases its costs.
Our model is motivated by the U.S. shipping conferences of the 19th and
20th centuries, which were legal cartels with broad enforcement capabilities,
encompassing ﬁrms exposed to diverse risk sources and that lacked for the
most side payments, except in some cases for very limited partial revenue
sharing agreements. Evidence from the shipping conferences largely supports
our model. With few ﬁrms, the rule favored by heterogeneous conferences is
unanimity. In larger cartels, the favored rule is either 2/3 or 3/4-majority
rule.
Constitutional aspects of legal cartels have been generally disregarded in
the economics literature. The classical work of Don Patinkin (1947), for in-
stance, likens legal cartels to multi-plant monopolies (another recurrent text-
book image). With complete proﬁt-sharing, the objectives of cartel members
are perfectly aligned and collective decisions procedures are largely irrele-
vant. As pointed by Bain (1948), however, in the absence of side-payments
there is no reason for a cartel to behave like a monopolist. Bain’s point has
been taken on by Schmalensee (1987), Harrington (1991), and others, who
1have applied a variety of cooperative game concepts to predict the behavior
of cartels. Though the political character of legal cartels was appreciated
early on by Daniel Marx (1953), the actual voting procedures used by cartels
to arrive at decisions were ignored in the literature up until the recent work
of Cave and Salant (1995).
Cave and Salant (1995) study majority voting about the total production
quota of the cartel. Under the assumption that the quota translates into ﬁrm-
speciﬁc quantity restrictions via some exogenous proportions, they show that
there is a Condorcet quota and therefore a stable cartel decision under simple
majority. This leaves unexplained why many cartels in the shipping industry
and in other instances opt instead for supermajority rules.
One possible explanation for supermajority requirements is that, in fact,
there is more than one relevant dimension in the collective decision problem
faced by cartels. As shown by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988, 1991), rules close to
64%-majority rule lead to stable decisions with very many voters under some
assumptions on individual preferences and the distribution of preferences.
Shipping cartels in our sample, however, have been concerned mostly with
a single-dimension issue, price-ﬁxing, over which single-peaked preferences
(and hence the existence of a Condorcet winner) can be easily obtained.
Another possible explanation to supermajority rules is the need for self-
enforceable collective decisions. As illustrated by Maggi and Morelli (2003),
self-enforceability pushes in the direction of unanimity voting in the context
of international organizations. Consistent with our focus on cartels with
legally-binding decisions, we ignore the issue of enforceability. Though sta-
bility and self-enforceability may indeed play a role in the actual choice of
voting rules by legal cartels, we have focused on the need of commitment
in the presence of uncertainty about cost and demand conditions as a more
appropriate explanation for the case of the shipping cartels.
2 Shipping Conferences and Their Constitu-
tions
Ocean carriers oﬀering regularly scheduled “liner” service have formed car-
tels, known as shipping conferences, since the 19th century. These cartels
have, until recently, largely received the blessing of political authorities.
In the United States, the source of our sample, shipping conferences must
2ﬁle their agreements with the government for approval. If approved, the
conference agreement is immune from the antitrust laws. Typically these
agreements have been approved without consideration of antitrust principles
(Mansﬁeld 1980, Mar´ ın and Sicotte 2003b).
Shipping conferences are organized across routes. Examples include the
conference covering traﬃc from United States Paciﬁc ports to Australia, and
the conference covering traﬃc from the Mediterranean to United States At-
lantic ports. Many shipping companies operate on multiple routes, and are
often members of multiple shipping conferences. Some ﬁrms are not mem-
bers of shipping conferences on one or more of the routes that they serve.
There is substantial heterogeneity among shipping conferences in terms of
their respective sizes and geographic coverage. Similarly, the characteristics
of diﬀerent shipping companies’ ﬂeets, such as the number of ships, their
tonnage, and their quality, vary widely.
Shipping conference member ﬁrms agree to ﬁx prices jointly. Conferences
can best be described as a case of semi-collusion, because they do not regu-
late many other strategic decisions by member ﬁrms, such as investment and
deployment of new ships. This often has resulted in substantial “service”
competition among conference members (Marx 1953, Jansson and Shneer-
son 1987). Although the U.S. government eﬀectively has enforced conference
freight rates, conferences have also seen ﬁt to include extensive self-policing
provisions in their agreements. A conference secretary or an independent
party is assigned the responsibility of verifying ﬁrms’ compliance with the
conference agreement. Bonds or cash are often deposited in a separately ad-
ministered account for the payment of penalties for violations of the agree-
ment. Competition from non conference ﬁrms is met through aggressive price
cuts or exclusive contracts with customers (Scott Morton 1997, Mar´ ın and
Sicotte 2003a).
Our interest in shipping cartels is in their decision-making process. Daniel
Marx, in his classic (1953) work on shipping conferences, states, “It should
be remembered that conferences are in a very real sense political organiza-
tions” (p. 148). Their agreements have constitutional attributes in that they
carefully lay out procedures for collective decision-making.1 In particular,
shipping conferences make decisions democratically. Each ﬁrm is entitled
1Several conference agreements are reproduced in their entirety in the proceedings of
an inquiry by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary
(1960), our main data source.
3to a single vote. Like national constitutions, most conferences employ two
types of voting rules: one for day-to-day matters, including freight rates, and
another for extraordinary decisions, such as amendments to the conference
agreement. The diﬀerent voting rules employed by 95 conferences serving
U.S. foreign trade in the late 1950s are detailed in Table 1. Of the 95 confer-
ences, 35 used the 2/3 rule, 28 required unanimity, 13 used simple majority,
15 required 3/4 of the members to agree, and 4 required all members minus
one to agree. For all conferences, amending the agreement requires at least
as many votes as deciding on freight rates. All 28 conferences that require
unanimity in ﬁxing prices also require unanimity for amendments. All con-
ferences that require 3/4 for price-ﬁxing also require unanimity for amending
the agreement. Of the 35 conferences that require 2/3 supermajority for
freight rates, 16 require unanimity for amendments, three require 4/5, one
requires 3/4 and 15 keep the 2/3 rule. Of the 13 conferences requiring simple
majority for price-ﬁxing, nine mandate unanimity for passing amendments,
and four keep the simple majority rule. The constitutional set-up thus varies
considerably by shipping conference, but most agreements would seem to be
designed to be relatively diﬃcult to amend. This suggests that the voting
rules themselves are relatively stable over the life of the cartel.2
Table 1. Shipping Conferences’ Voting Rules
Shipping conferences serving US foreign trade in late 1950’s
Voting Rule Price-Fixing Amendments
to the Agreement




All Save One 4 3
Unanimity 28 69
Observations: 95.
Source: U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary (1960), insert between pp. 690 and 691.
Little is known about exactly how the conferences reached their agree-
ment, and exactly what was the nature of the discussion leading to their
2The age of the shipping conferences in our sample varies substantially. Most pre-date
World War II, but were disrupted temporarily during the war and a few years thereafter.
See U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary (1960).
4decision about which voting rule to adopt. Despite the fact that conferences
are required to submit their agreements to the government, their internal
disputes and negotiations remain highly guarded business secrets.
In the next section, we model the choice of a voting rule assuming that
there is ex ante uncertainty about the relative positions of ﬁrms. There are
good reasons that ﬁrms would doubt their relative position in the conference
ex ante. Firms cannot be sure which vessels their partners will decide to
deploy, and how their investment in new, higher quality ships over time will
proceed. Moreover, because conferences in the United States are “open”
by law, entry (and exit for that matter) is possible. The ﬁrms negotiating
the original agreement cannot know for certain the identity of their future
partners.
We assume that ﬁrms view their future competitive position within a
given conference as a random variable. Firms know the distribution of that
variable, which is based on characteristics of member ﬁrms and the shipping
route at the conference’s inception. As a consequence, ﬁrms anticipate the
future heterogeneity of the shipping conference. Moreover, ﬁrms’ expected
discounted proﬁts are similar for every given constitution at the inception of
the cartel, so that they agree in the objective of maximizing expected proﬁts.
After all, conferences’ constitutions are arrived at by consensus among mem-
ber ﬁrms, and we expect agreement by consensus to be more likely among
agents with roughly similar interests. The constitutional problem faced by
the cartel, then, corresponds to that envisioned by Harsanyi (1955). Rawls’s
(1971) objections to the representation of the choice of a constitution as maxi-
mization of expected payoﬀs under uncertainty, such as diﬃculties computing
probabilities of diﬀerent events or performing interpersonal comparisons of
utility, have less bite when the society in composed of agents single-mindedly
maximizing expected monetary proﬁts.
3 The Model
We consider an industry with n ﬁrms. All ﬁrms are regulated by a cartel
that ﬁxes the same price for all. Firm i proﬁts are given by Vi(p,θ), where
p ∈ <+ is the price set by the cartel and θ = (θ1,...,θn) ∈ {θB,θG}n
is a vector indicating the cost and demand conditions faced by each ﬁrm.
θi = θB indicates that ﬁrm i faces “bad conditions” and θi = θG indicates
that it faces “good conditions.” Firms facing similar conditions have the same
5proﬁts, and those proﬁts depend only on the fraction of ﬁrms facing good
conditions. That is, deﬁning γ as the fraction of ﬁrms facing good conditions,
there is a pair of functions VB and VG such that for every i with θi = θB,
Vi(p,θ) = VB(p,γ) and for every i with θi = θG, Vi(p,θ) = VG(p,γ). Finally,
we assume that VB(p,γ) and VG(p,γ) are concave and single-peaked in p,
achieving their maximum values in pB(γ) and pG(γ), and satisfying pB(γ) >
pG(γ) and VB(p,γ),VG(p,γ) ≥ 0 for p ∈ [minx∈[0,1] pG(x),maxx∈[0,1] pB(x)] for
every γ ∈ [0,1]. This implies that proﬁts are positive in an interval containing
every ﬁrm’s favorite prices. We deﬁne the domain of the functions VB, VG,
pB, and pG as independent of n because we are interested in performing
comparative statics with respect to the cartel size. Of course, for a ﬁxed n,
γ can take only ﬁnitely many values; that is, γ ∈ Γn = {0,1/n,2/n,...,1}.
Firms set the cartel price according to some voting rule. A voting rule
is a pair (q,s), where q ∈ Qn = {d(n + 1)/2e/n,...,(n − 1)/n,1} is the
supermajority requirement and s ∈ <+ is the status quo price. If γ ≤ 1 − q,
the cartel price is set at pB(γ). If γ ≥ q, the cartel price is set at pG(γ).
Otherwise, the cartel price is set at s if pG(γ) ≤ s ≤ pB(γ), at pG(γ) if
s < pG(γ), and at pB(γ) if pB(γ) < s. In other words, the status quo is chosen
as long at it is undominated under the q-majority rule; if it is dominated,
the closest undominated price is chosen. Note that if q = d(n + 1)/2e/n
(simple majority rule), and n is odd, the status quo is irrelevant. On the
other hand, if q = 1 (unanimity rule), the status quo is chosen unless it is
Pareto-dominated.
We study the optimal choice of voting rule from an ex ante perspective.
That is, we assume that θ is drawn by nature from some distribution before
the cartel price is set but after the voting rule has been chosen by the cartel.
The random variables e θi are exchangeable, that is, any realization θ is equally
likely than any permutation of θ. This guarantees that ﬁrms share as a
common objective the maximization of (the same) expected beneﬁts. For
a given n, we represent prior beliefs about γ by a distribution function Fn
satisfying Fn(γ) = Fn(bnγc/n), Fn(0) ≥ 0, and F(1) = 1.
We have:
Lemma 1 For every given n, there is an optimal voting rule.
Proof. Given a supermajority requirement, the expected payoﬀ for the
cartel can be easily shown to be a continuous function of the status quo
price. Without loss of generality, we can consider exclusively status quo
6prices in the interval [minγ∈Γn pG(γ),maxγ∈Γn pB(γ)]. Then, by Weierstrass
Theorem, there is a status quo price that maximizes the expected payoﬀ for
each given supermajority requirement. Since there are only ﬁnitely many
possible supermajority requirements for each n, there must be some pair or
pairs (q,s) that maximize the expected payoﬀ for the cartel members.
To characterize the eﬀect of cartel size on the optimal voting rule, we
make the following assumption:
(A1) The secuence of functions {Fn,n ∈ ℵ} converges uniformly to a con-
tinuous function F(γ) that is strictly increasing for γ ∈ (0,1), with
F(γ) = 0 for γ ≤ 0 and F(γ) = 1 − F(1 − γ) for every γ.
We can think of F as the limiting distribution of a cartel with very many
ﬁrms. Note that the limiting distribution is symmetric around 1/2.
We have
Theorem 1 Suppose (A1) is satisﬁed. Then, there is some ﬁnite n such






(γVG(p,γ) + (1 − γ)VB(p,γ))dF(γ)

(intuitively, the optimal status quo price in the limiting case when the su-












(γVG(pB(γ),γ) + (1 − γ)VB(pB(γ),γ))dF(γ)
(intuitively, the expected beneﬁt for cartel members in the limiting case when
the supermajority requirement is q). This expression is continuous so it
achieves a maximum or maxima on q ∈ [1/2,1]. We claim that the values
7of q maximizing g can be bounded away from 1/2 and 1. To see this, we
compute
g
0(q) ∝ qVG(p(q),q) + (1 − q)VB(p(q),q)
+ (1 − q)VG(p(q),1 − q) + qVB(p(q),1 − q)
− (qVG(pG(q),q) + (1 − q)VB(pG(q),q))
− ((1 − q)VG(pB(1 − q),1 − q) + qVB(pB(1 − q),1 − q)).
Note that
g
0(1/2) ∝ (VG(p(1/2),1/2) + VB(p(1/2),1/2))
− 1/2(VG(pG(1/2),1/2) + VB(pG(1/2),1/2))
− 1/2(VG(pB(1/2),1/2) + VB(pB(1/2),1/2)),
which is positive because VG(p,1/2) + VB(p,1/2) is strictly concave and is
maximized at p(1/2). Note also that
g
0(1) ∝ VG(p(1),1) + VB(p(1),0) − VG(pG(1),1) − VB(pB(0),0),
which is negative because VG(p,1) is maximized at pG(1) and VB(p,0) is
maximized at pB(0).







(γVG(p,γ) + (1 − γ)VB(p,γ))Pr(γ)

.
The optimal voting rule given n is given by the solution to the problem of












(γVG(pB(γ),γ) + (1 − γ)VB(pB(γ),γ))Pr(γ).
The sequence of functions {gn,n ∈ ℵ} converges uniformly to g, and the
sequence of choice sets {Qn,n ∈ ℵ} includes supermajority requirements
8arbitrarily close to 1/2 and 1 as n increases. Since the supermajority re-
quirements maximizing g are bounded away from 1/2 and 1, so will be those
maximizing gn for large enough n.
A uniqueness result (at least for large cartels) can be obtained by assum-
ing that the proﬁts of ﬁrms facing good and bad conditions are independent
of the conditions faced by other ﬁrms.
(A2) There is pair of functions WG(p) and WB(p) such that for every γ,
VG(p,γ) = WG(p) and VB(p,γ) = WB(p).
This assumption is just a useful simpliﬁcation, that allows us to present
the optimal supermajority requirement as the result of equalizing the “marginal
beneﬁts” and the “marginal costs” of more stringent requirements, as illus-
trated below.
Corollary 1 Suppose (A1) and (A2) are satisﬁed. Then, there is some q∗ ∈
(1/2,1) such that the optimal supermajority requirement converges to q∗ as
n increases.
Proof. We can rewrite the expression for g0(q) from the prof of the
theorem as:
g
0(q) ∝ (1 − q)[VB(p(q),q) − VB(pG(q),q)]
+ (1 − q)[VG(p(q),1 − q) − VG(pB(1 − q),1 − q)]
− q[VG(pG(q),q) − VG(p(q),q)]
− q[VB(pB(1 − q),1 − q) − VB(p(q),1 − q)].
The ﬁrst two terms represent the marginal beneﬁt for minorities, while the
last two terms represent the marginal cost for majorities due to more strin-
gent supermajority requirements. Note that all terms in brackets are posi-
tive. Under (A2), all terms in brackets are constant, so the ﬁrst two terms
in the expression for g0 are continuous and decreasing in q and the last two
terms are continuous and increasing in q. It follows that there is a unique
q∗ such that g0(q∗) = 0.
Considering the choice of voting rule as a result of equalizing the marginal
cost and the marginal beneﬁt of more stringent supermajorities resembles the
9classic analysis by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). In our case, however, the
beneﬁts and costs are grounded in a particular industrial organization model.
We are also interested in performing comparative statics with respect to
the heterogeneity of the cartel. We let
(A3) VG(p,γ) = VB(p + δ,γ),
where δ > 0 is an indicator of the heterogeneity of the cartel, as measured
by the conﬂict of interests between ﬁrms. We have
Corollary 2 If (A1), (A2), and (A3) are satisﬁed, then q∗ is weakly in-
creasing in δ. In particular, for a given n, there is some δ such that optimal
supermajority requirement is not simple majority for δ ≥ δ.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the derivative of
VB(p(q),q) − VB(pG(q),q) + VG(p(q),1 − q) − VG(pB(1 − q),1 − q)
(corresponding to the marginal beneﬁt) with respect to δ is positive, and the
derivative of
VG(pG(q),q) − VG(p(q),q) + VB(pB(1 − q),1 − q) − VB(p(q),1 − q)
(corresponding to the marginal cost) with respect to δ is negative. To see
this, using (A2) and (A3), the ﬁrst expression can be written as
WB(p(q)) − WB(pG(q)) + WB(p(q) + δ) − WB(pB(1 − q) + δ).
The result follows from p(q) < pB(1−q) (in fact, the optimal price for ﬁrms
facing bad conditions is now independent of γ) and the fact that WB is
concave and achieves a maximum at pB(1 − q). Similarly, using (A2) and
(A3), the second expression can be written as
WB(pG(q) + δ) − WB(p(q) + δ) + WB(pB(1 − q)) − WB(p(q),
and we can use pG(q) < p(q).
104 Data
In this section we describe the data used in the analysis and summarize
some of its key features. Our data consists of a sample of 95 shipping con-
ferences. We obtained information about the voting rules that these confer-
ences employed for setting freight rates from hearings before the U.S. House
Committee on the Judiciary (Antitrust Subcommittee) in 1959 (U.S. House
Committee on the Judiciary 1960).
The model predicts that the number of ﬁrms should inﬂuence the choice
of a voting rule in that the larger the number of ﬁrms, the less likely that
unanimity and simple majority will be chosen. Data on the ﬁrms in each
conference were taken from Croner’s Directory of Freight Conferences (1961).
The distribution of conferences by number of ﬁrms and their relationship to
voting rules is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Frequency distribution of voting rules
by number of cartel members
# Members Total Unanimous All Save Three Two Simple
One Quarters Thirds Majority
3 - 6 30 18 0 3 4 5
7 - 12 29 6 3 6 9 5
13 - 20 27 4 1 3 17 2
21 - 9 0 0 3 5 1
All 95 28 4 15 35 13
Observations: 95.
Source: See text.
For conferences with fewer than six members, unanimity is the rule most
often employed, but for larger conferences the 2/3 rule is most common.
An issue that arises is that for several conferences, two voting rules may
require the same number of ﬁrms in order to win given the current number
of ﬁrms in cartel. For example, in a conference with six members, both simple
majority and the 2/3 rule require four votes to win. Nonetheless, we code
the dependent variable uniquely as the rule listed in the data source. The
logic behind this decision is that the voting rule was chosen at some prior
date (unknown), and the current number of members in the conference may
or may not be the same as the original number of members who chose the
11voting rule. Entry and exit from shipping cartels occurs, and is facilitated
by U.S. law that requires conferences to be “open” to new members. We
do, however, assume that the number of ﬁrms in the conference is correlated
with the original number of ﬁrms that chose the voting rule.
Some ﬁrms also entered into revenue pooling agreements with other ﬁrms
in the same conference. Each individual ﬁrm still maintained their own vote,
although the pooling ﬁrms’ interests would be aligned. Theory predicts that
if cartel members pool revenues, the choice of a rule is irrelevant. Examin-
ing the pooling agreements that were active during the period of our study,
however, indicates that almost all such agreements consisted involved only
a small fraction of cartel members. Omitting the three agreements where
pooling involved more than 50% of the ﬁrms does not aﬀect the results pre-
sented in the following section. Incomplete pooling will align the interests
only of the pooling ﬁrms, and thus will not diminish the desire of the rest of
the members of favoring super-majority rules in the conditions described in
the model. (The pooling agreements are listed in U.S. House Committee on
the Judiciary 1960, pp. 778-79.) Either measure of cartel size gave nearly
identical results.
The model emphasizes the importance of conﬂicts of interest between
ﬁrms in the cartel driven by heterogeneity in costs or quality. Quality is
associated with the age of a vessel; newer ships typically have lower operating
costs and improved cargo handling capabilities, although ﬁxed costs for new
ships are often higher than for old ships (see e.g. Benford 1962 and Stopford
1997). We measure the quality of a ﬁrm’s ﬂeet by the average age of the ships
that it owns. We computed two measures of quality heterogeneity within a
conference: the coeﬃcient of variation and Gini coeﬃcient of the member
ﬁrms’ ﬂeet quality (corrected for small-sample bias as suggested by Deltas
2003). Data on the ships owned by individual ﬁrms and the ages of these
vessels were obtained from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping.
Table 3 shows the distribution of voting rules by quality heterogeneity.
Unanimity is associated with extremely homogeneous cartels, and superma-
jorities of 2/3 and 3/4 are more prevalent in the most heterogeneous cartels.
Simple majority is more associated with cartels with moderate degree of het-
erogeneity. We also include in our estimations the distance in thousands of
miles of the route covered by a particular shipping conference. This vari-
able is intended to capture barriers to entry, because distance is positively
associated with the ﬁxed cost of establishing service on a particular route
because of the need for larger vessels. Distance is taken from the U.S. Navy
12(1931) and Reed’s Table of Distances (1953). Although not the focus of our
model, it is reasonable to expect that barriers to entry might aﬀect the opti-
mal choice of a cartel voting rule. The threat of competition might demand
greater ﬂexibility in response, increasing the desirability of rules approach-
ing simple majority. Perhaps, instead, the threat of competition might create
the need to “circle the wagons” and adopt joint retaliation. This may induce
some ﬁrms to exit the cartel, bringing back issues of self-enforceability we
have ignored. Finally, larger supermajority requirements may be enshrined
in the cartel agreements to avoid newcomers to have an undesirable impact
on price policies. We have no a priori expectation as to which eﬀect, if either,
is observable in our sample.
Table 3. Frequency distribution of voting rules
by quality heterogeneity
Heterogeneity Total Unanimous All Save Three Two Simple
One Quarters Thirds Majority
0.0 - 0.5 12 11 0 0 0 1
0.5 - 1.0 23 4 3 4 6 6
1.0 - 1.5 27 6 1 2 13 5
1.5 - 2.0 17 4 0 3 9 1
2.0 - 16 3 0 6 7 0




We model the choice of a voting rule in both an ordered probit and a multi-
nomial logit framework. Results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
The dependent variable takes the value 0 for unanimity rule, 1 for all save
one, 2 for three-quarters, 3 for two-thirds and 4 for simple majority. The
number of ﬁrms, a measure of quality heterogeneity, and distance are the in-
dependent variables.3 There are two speciﬁcations in each table. In the ﬁrst,
3The cut points or constant terms are not displayed. The results for All Save One are
not shown in Table 5 or 6. Full results are available upon request.
13the coeﬃcient of variation of the average age of cartel members’ ﬂeets is used
as the measure of quality heterogeneity. In the second, the Gini coeﬃcient
of the average age is employed.
In the ordered probits, the only statistically signiﬁcant variable is the
number of ﬁrms. In both speciﬁcations, the greater the number of ﬁrms,
the greater the probability that voting rules employing lower supermajori-
ties or simple majority will be employed. This is only partial support for
the theoretical model. The ordered probits do not detect any signiﬁcant re-
lationship between our measures of quality heterogeneity and the choice of
a voting rule. Because the dependent variable begins with the maximum
supermajority (unanimity) and ends with simple majority, one would sus-
pect that an ordered probit would be the preferred technique. However, the
Schwarz (1978) model selection criterion indicates that the multinomial logit
is preferred. This suggests that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between the
diﬀerent supermajority rules that is not captured by the ordered probit.
Table 4. Ordered Probits
Speciﬁcation #1 Speciﬁcation #2
# Firms 0.044 0.035
(1.98) (2.27)
Quality Coeﬀ. of Variation -0.108
(-0.47)
Quality Gini Coeﬃcient 0.299
(0.19)
Distance (thousand miles) 0.031 0.045
(0.71) (0.04)
Log-likelihood -131.025 -131.106
Schwarz Criterion -146.964 -147.045
z statistics in parenthesis.
Observations: 95.
We turn now to the multinomial logits. In Table 5, simple majority is the
base case. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the number of ﬁrms is statistically signif-
icant (and negative) only in the comparison between unanimity and simple
14majority. This is consistent with the data presented in Table 3. Increased
quality heterogeneity, as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation, on the
other hand, is positively associated with all supermajority rules relative to
simple majority. The degree of signiﬁcance is stronger for the three-quarters
and two-thirds rules than for unanimity. Distance is statistically signiﬁcant
only in its positive relationship with the two-thirds rule relative to simple
majority. The results of this speciﬁcation are quite supportive of the theo-
retical model, illustrating the importance of the number of ﬁrms and quality
heterogeneity in inﬂuencing cartels’ choices of voting rules.
Table 5. Multinomial Logits
Speciﬁcation #1 Speciﬁcation #2
Unanimity Three Two Unanimity Three Two
Quarters Thirds Quarters Thirds
Firms -0.268 -0.036 -0.014 -0.164 0.102 0.118
(-2.51) (-0.40) (-0.16) (-1.91) (1.49) (1.73)
Quality Coeﬀ. 1.355 1.931 1.910
of Variation (1.76) (2.57) (2.80)
Quality Gini 2.702 4.363 6.44
Coeﬃcient (0.76) (1.24) (1.77)
Distance 0.052 -0.292 0.293 -0.005 -0.390 0.234
(1000 miles) (0.37) (-1.30) (1.84) (-0.04) (-1.93) (1.40)
Log-likelihood -108.253 -110.332
Schwarz Criterion -137.853 -139.932
Hausman Test 3.64 0.81
χ-square (2,12)
z statistics in parenthesis. Base case is simple majority.
Observations: 95.
The results in the second speciﬁcation are also supportive of the model,
albeit that speciﬁcation has a lower log-likelihood than the ﬁrst. The coef-
ﬁcient on the number of ﬁrms is now signiﬁcant for the three supermajority
15rules. Interestingly, it is negative only for unanimity. That is, the larger
the number of ﬁrms the more likely it is some intermediate supermajority
requirement. This is entirely consistent with the theoretical model. The
Gini coeﬃcient measure of quality heterogeneity is not signiﬁcant, although
the coeﬃcients have the same sign as in the previous speciﬁcation. Distance
is now signiﬁcant (and negative) when comparing the three-quarters rule to
simple majority.
A major criticism of applying the multinomial logit is the assumption of
the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Hausman and McFadden (1984)
propose a test of the reasonableness of this assumption by arbitrarily drop-
ping one decision and seeing if the coeﬃcients on the others change dramat-
ically. We conducted this test, and the χ-square statistics are reported in
Table 5. In both instances, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that
the assumption is valid.
Table 6. Marginal Effects Evaluated at Means
Speciﬁcation #1
Unanimity Three Two Simple
Quarters Thirds Majority
Firms -0.046 0.006 0.027 0.013
(-3.24) (0.77) (1.92) (1.18)
Quality Coeﬀ. -0.012 0.069 0.210 -0.230
of Variation (-0.10) (1.00) (1.72) (-2.54)
Distance -0.013 -0.052 0.077 -0.018
(1000 miles) (-0.70) (-2.67) (2.72) (-0.94)
Speciﬁcation #2
Unanimity Three Two Simple
Quarters Thirds Majority
Firms -0.044 0.011 0.040 -0.004
(-4.40) (1.75) (3.31) (-0.41)
Quality Gini -0.300 0.052 1.000 -0.717
Coeﬃcient (-0.52) (0.17) (1.47) (-1.54)
Distance 0.014 -0.057 0.073 -0.010
(1000 miles) (-0.75) (-3.40) (2.48) (-0.50)
z statistics in parenthesis.
Observations: 95.
16An examination of the marginal eﬀects in Table 6 conﬁrms the basic
conclusions of the Table 5. There appear to be strong incentives to avoid
the unanimity rule when the number of ﬁrms is high, and cartels tend to
choose the two-thirds and to a lesser extent the three-quarters rule in that
case. These results mirror those presented in Table 3. Quality heterogeneity
reduces the probability of choosing simple majority and increases the proba-
bility of choosing the two-thirds rule. Cartels serving longer routes, perhaps
indicating higher barriers to entry, tend to favor the two-thirds rule, and
shorter routes the three-quarters rule. Thus, there is some evidence that
lower barriers to entry induce cartel members to “circle the wagons.”
In sum, the econometric evidence provides substantial, although not over-
whelming, support for the theoretical model. Quality heterogeneity is asso-
ciated with larger supermajorities, up to a point, and increased cartel mem-
bership is associated with reduced use of the unanimity rule in favor of lower
supermajorities.
6 Conclusion
In order to understand the choice of voting rules by legal cartels, we pro-
pose a simple theoretical model based on the idea that cartels maximize
expected proﬁts. The model predicts that cartels with more ﬁrms will favor
neither unanimity nor, to a lesser extent, simple majority. The model also
predicts that heterogeneous cartels will not favor simple majority. Empirical
exercises using a database from the U.S. shipping cartels of the mid-20th
century provide substantial evidence to the model. The empirical analysis
also suggests that lower barriers to entry induce the adoption of intermediate
supermajority rules, an issue we will explore in future work.
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